1
Department of Jurisprodence and lslamic law, Faculty of Theologe , University of Qom, Qom, Iran.
2
Ialamic law,qom,qom,iran
Abstract
The purport of the principle of Nafy-e Sabīl (negation of domination) is the rejection of any ruling established by the Sharīʿa that would result in the dominance of a non-Muslim over a Muslim, or of non-Muslims over the Muslim community. The principal evidence invoked for this principle is Qurʾān 4:141 along with the Prophetic tradition of ʿuluww (superiority). Nevertheless, extensive debates have arisen regarding both the scope of the verse and the Prophetic report. The main difficulty with the verse lies in its semantic ambiguity, stemming from its context and the interpretation provided in traditions that diverge from the common reading. Likewise, the ʿuluww report is deficient in both chain of transmission and clarity of meaning, as its apparent sense affirms the superiority of Islam over unbelief, rather than that of Muslims over non-Muslims. Thus, it establishes no more than the epistemic and rational superiority of Islam over unbelief. Moreover, the verse concerning rukūn pertains specifically to reliance upon an unjust person, which differs in subject matter from domination by non-Muslims. Similarly, the verse on wilāya addresses mutual friendship and affection, rather than issues of authority or domination. From the authors’ perspective, the application of the Nafy-e Sabīl principle in jurisprudential branches, as undertaken by jurists, is disputable insofar as it depends on the conventional recognition of the notion of domination. At a broader level, the principle does not extend beyond the negation of domination in the general social sphere and should thus be regarded as a rational, rather than a strictly scriptural, rule.
