The determination of the subject of the right to Qisas in intentional homicide constitutes a foundational jurisprudential inquiry with profound legal ramifications for retaliation, succession, and testamentary dispositions. Article 365 of the Islamic Penal Code implies that the right to Qisas is vested in the victim, as evidenced by the provision for the victim’s waiver prior to demise. Similarly, Article 352 reinforces the continuity of this right post-mortem by acknowledging the spouse’s entitlement to settlement Diyyah, rendering heirs mere proxies for the victim. An alternative doctrine suggests the inheritance of this right by the heirs; yet, both perspectives identify the victim as the primary holder, a conception inconsistent with the literal injunction of Verse 33, Surah Al-Isra. A third view, aligned with the verse, contends that the right is primordially and directly vested in the legal heirs. A fourth proposition posits that the right resides with the victim during their lifetime, but upon their death, the Lawgiver institutes an independent right for the heirs. Through an analytical-critical approach, this study seeks to elucidate the correct legal basis. The findings indicate that, pursuant to Verse 33 of Surah Al-Isra, the right to Qisas is primordially and directly vested in the legal heirs. Furthermore, Verse 45 of Surah Al-Ma’idah does not serve to determine the right-holder, and the victim—lacking legal capacity—possesses no primordial entitlement. Accordingly, narrations contradicting Verse 33 regarding the establishment and persistence of the right for the victim must be qualified or dismissed.