This research analyzes the conflict between the "Rule of Jubb" (Al-Islām yajubbu mā qablah), a principle of divine grace, and the "Principle of Justice" in safeguarding the Rights of People (Huquq al-Nas). Focusing on verse 38 of Surah Al-Anfal and using qualitative and comparative analysis of Islamic legal texts, this article investigates the rationale for exempting Huquq al-Nas from the rule's generality.
Findings indicate that despite a consensus on absolving the Rights of God (Huquq Allah), the decisive trend in Islamic jurisprudence is to except the Rights of People—including debts, liabilities, and the right to retribution (qisas)—thus affirming their non-absolution.
The philosophy of this exception rests on three intertwined foundations. First, a theological, justice-centered basis: divine mercy cannot lead to injustice, given the ontological distinction between the rights of God and the rights of people. Second, a jurisprudential-usuli basis that, viewing the rule as a form of grace (imtinaani), uses mechanisms like specification (takhsis) to prioritize proofs that uphold individual rights. Third, a socio-systemic basis that emphasizes preserving public order and the legal-economic security of society to prevent chaos.
Ultimately, the research concludes that this exception is not a weakening of the Rule of Jubb. Instead, it demonstrates the Islamic legal system's sophisticated mechanism for balancing individual mercy with social justice and the public interest.